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easoning is at the heart of design activity, and it determines how hu-
mans respond to situations in every aspect of their lives (Johnson-
Laird, 2009). The reasoning of designers consists of trains of
thought, including deliberation, argumentation and making logical inferences
(Rittel, 1987), and it is central to understanding and supporting design
activity.
Drawing on the works of Peirce (1980), inferences in design are described as
being driven by abductive reasoning (Dorst, 2011; Roozenburg, 1993), mean-
ing that design activity begins by hypothesising desired outcomes or functions,
and it moves towards proposing forms and structures that can realise such
desired outcomes. Pertaining to the processes involved in design, diﬀerent
models describe the activity as comprising stages that begin by formulatingwww.elsevier.com/locate/destud
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40initial hypotheses to propose desired functions followed by the generation of
probable behaviours and solutions to such functions, involving evaluation
and reﬂection on which solutions are suitable for the desired function
(March, 1976; Sch€on, 1991). Such processes involve both abductive, deductive
and inductive reasoning; they are learning processes that do not follow strict
abductive-deductive-inductive sequences (March, 1976).
Rittel (1987) describes design activity as a disorderly process that is inherently
argumentative in its reasoning. Design activity involves the negotiation among
the diﬀerent perspectives and desires of those involved in a design process
(Bucciarelli, 2002). Hence, design is understood as a social process through
which solutions emerge as the result of argumentation among the diﬀerent per-
spectives and values of those involved in the process. In such processes,
reasoning is reﬂected by the deliberation and arguing among designers where
language plays a performative role in that it enacts and constitutes design
(Dong, 2007).
However, the related empirical studies of the reasoning and structure of design
activity have in common that they concern design activity in relation to the
proposition, detailing and evaluation of objects through inference by applying
‘design thinking’. Such analyses are either performed conceptually (Dorst,
2011; March, 1976; Roozenburg, 1993) or they rely on verbal reports that
(post)rationalise the activity undertaken (e.g., Galle, 1996b; Lloyd & Scott,
1994), making them unsuitable for capturing the argumentative aspects of
reasoning processes as they occur in situations that are contentious and inﬂu-
enced by diverging values, objectives and desires (Bucciarelli, 2002; Stumpf &
McDonnell, 2002).
Consequently, the study sets out to empirically analyse reasoning in a verbal
form as it occurs among people engaged in design activity. This necessitates
combining a tradition for describing a logic of design through formal
reasoning (March, 1976; Roozenburg, 1993) with notions of design as enacted
through language (Dong, 2007) among individuals with diﬀering intentions
and perceptions (Bucciarelli, 2002). The study aims to contribute with a novel
analysis and perspective on empirical reasoning in design and its implications
for design in practice.1 Theory and background
1.1 Logical reasoning
Since the works of C.S. Peirce in the mid-20th century and earlier, logical
reasoning has been formulated as being deductive, inductive or abductive
(Peirce, 1980). These reasoning types deﬁne three distinctly diﬀerent ways of
drawing conclusions from premises.Design Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
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sion based on the logical implications of two or more propositions asserted to
be true (Magnani, 1995; March, 1976; Reichertz, 2010). Consequently, deduc-
tion is justiﬁcational as the premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion
(Schurz, 2007). An example of deductive reasoning is as follows:
The weather is sunny. John only brings his umbrella when it rains, so he will
not bring it today.
Inductive reasoning is the process of deriving plausible conclusions that go
beyond the information in the premises (Johnson-Laird, 2009). Inductive
reasoning is self-referencing in a manner that is similar to deductive reasoning
in that it infers concepts only from available data within a model or frame of
reference (Magnani, 1995; Reichertz, 2010; Schurz, 2007). Unlike deduction,
induction does not produce guaranteed true conclusions as deduction does.
Instead, inductive reasoning infers conclusions that go beyond the available
data. An example of inductive reasoning is as follows:
Upon having drawn five white marbles from the bag, Peter concludes that all
the remaining marbles in the bag must be white.
Abductive reasoning is a process of conjecture that yields the best (and
simplest) explanation to a course of events. An abduction is the preliminary
estimate that introduces plausible hypotheses and informs where to ﬁrst
enquire by choosing the best candidate among a multitude of possible expla-
nations (Magnani, 1995; Schurz, 2007). Therefore, abduction is reductive;
however, it does not, unlike induction, require one to draw conclusions
from available data. Abductive reasoning diﬀers from deductive and inductive
reasoning in that abduction involves guessing and (sometimes unfounded) as-
sumptions as the basis for reasoning. An example of abductive reasoning is as
follows:
Lisa’s fingerprints were on the gun that shot Michael. Lisa is suspected of
firing the gun.
In design activity, abductive reasoning involves the conception of new rules or
types of relationships to explain an intended outcome (Roozenburg, 1993).
This innovative potential of abductive reasoning makes it a creative feat, by
deﬁnition, and thus also necessary in the generation of anything original
(Dorst, 2011; Reichertz, 2010). In contrast, neither deductive nor inductive
reasoning can propose entirely new ideas or concepts because they depend
on available data to draw conclusions (Peirce, 1980).
The logic of reasoning in design is proposed to be an abductive activity moving
from function to form (Dorst, 2011; Roozenburg, 1993). In cases of reasoningsign reasoning patterns 41
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(Roozenburg, 1995) or abduction-2 (Dorst, 2011) signifying a type of reasoning
that moves from an aspired value or function towards a form, but without
knowing either the working principle or form beforehand. A more recent pro-
posal elaborates this process as a two-step abductive process that invents a
form (design object), a mode of use and a mode of action to fulﬁl the desired
function (Kroll & Koskela, 2015). One way to exemplify reasoning in design
used originally by Roozenburg (1993) and later elaborated by Kroll &
Koskela (2015) is the imagined ﬁrst development of a kettle to boil water using
a stove. The ﬁrst abduction pertains to the desired outcome of making water
boil (function), which necessitates placing water on the burner for heating,
concluding one, among many possible, modes of action. The second abduction
concludes that a device to hold the water in place (form) is one, among many
possible, viable solutions on the premise of the just-concluded modes of action.
Thus, abduction is also termed as the inference to the best explanation because
it involves a particularly promising conjecture (Roozenburg, 1993; Schurz,
2007).
In the above deﬁnitions and examples, reasoning processes are conceptual and
assume a logically sound reasoning pattern whereby abductive reasoning is the
only reasoning type with the potential to create something new (Dorst, 2011;
Roozenburg, 1993).1.2 Premises for reasoning
Per the deﬁnition, the reasoning types of deduction, induction and abduction
deﬁne ways of making inferences from premises that reﬂect the knowledge and
beliefs held by the person engaged in reasoning (Dorst, 2011). Such knowledge
and beliefs form e and stem from e mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983).
Mental models are constructs that organise knowledge pertaining to speciﬁc
contexts (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) and are thus relevant in the under-
standing of human behaviour and reasoning in design activity (Badke-
schaub, Lauche, Neumann, & Ahmed, 2007). Mental models are not ﬁxed,
and they change according to the new experiences and knowledge created in
relevant situations (Johnson-Laird, 2009). Thus, as logical reasoning is based
on mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), inferences drawn from reasoning are
not ﬁxed and vary among individuals. Hence, empirically studying reasoning
implies that the reasoning observed reﬂects, and depends on, the individual
mental models held.
Rittel (1987) deﬁnes reasoning in design as a process of argumentation. In
design activity, this results in issues and competing positions that are simulta-
neously interconnected and ‘open’ as a consequence of diﬀerent mental
models. When engaged in a verbal discourse, these divergent perspectives
can appear as speculation, argumentation, trade-oﬀs or negotiationDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
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dialogue with other people, a person uses mental models, implicitly or explic-
itly, to create a frame of understanding, which in turn allows for the generation
and description of solutionsedesign activity. As design is a social process
(Bucciarelli, 2002) involving the diﬀering perspectives of those involved, ideas
are not necessarily understood or accepted by the audience, resulting in an
argumentative interaction among the participants (Stumpf & McDonnell,
2002). Thus, the ‘logic’ of verbal reasoning takes the form of conclusions based
on premises that both draw on existing understandings (facts) and on values
(Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002) and thus diverge from the logical deﬁnitions
of reasoning that assume a universal truth for deductive reasoning and a strict
adherence to only what is observed for inductive reasoning (Peirce, 1980).
Taking the deﬁnition of reasoning in design as a process of argumentation at
face value (Rittel, 1987), the ﬁeld of argumentation theory and rhetoric oﬀers
insights to explain reasoning in groups of people. Argumentation theory de-
ﬁnes argumentation as an integral part of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber,
2011). Thus, analysing conversation in groups of people engaged in design
holds the potential to facilitate an understanding of and explain verbal
reasoning as the deployment of linguistic processes to satisfy the demands of
reasoning (Polk & Newell, 1995). Such attempts at verbal reasoning derive
their eﬀectiveness from their similarity to formal types of reasoning
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1973). A consonant explanation from the ﬁeld
of cognitive science is that the beliefs and knowledge held in the mental models
used to reason about speciﬁc tasks or events are held in working memory and
may therefore be articulated (Christensen & Schunn, 2009).
Verbal reasoning is therefore not identical to the deductive, inductive or ab-
ductive reasoning types in the formal logical sense; however, a verbal realisa-
tion bears similarities to logical reasoning types in their verbal deployment.
Therefore, perceiving group dialogues as a process of argumentation is repre-
sentative of the underlying reasoning with the important implications that a)
the reasoning reﬂects the deployment of a mental model that might be diﬀerent
from the ones held by those addressed in verbal reasoning (Badke-schaub
et al., 2007; Johnson-Laird, 1983) and that b) the verbal enactment of such
reasoning is inﬂuenced by values and beliefs and in turn acts to propose a
certain perspective (Dong, 2007; Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002).1.3 Models of design activity
Various models and frameworks emphasise design as a process involving
diﬀerent types of activity and as a process of inquiry. The following section re-
views such models of design activity focusing on descriptions or prescriptions
of the micro-level steps and thinking involved in design activity, i.e., the
diﬀerent reasoning implied by the models.sign reasoning patterns 43
44Drawing on the works of Peirce and thus drawing on the formal reasoning
types directly, March (1976) proposes the production-deduction-induction
(PDI) model. The PDI model proposes a rational design process of cyclic iter-
ative procedures characterised by three diﬀerent types of reasoning, proposing
a productiveedeductiveeinductive cycle as a necessary element of reasoning
in design. First, productive reasoning composes something novel. It suggests
that something may be. Second, deductive reasoning decomposes and predicts
the performance characteristics of a design that emerge from analysis of the
composition. It proves that something must be. Third, inductive reasoning sup-
poses from the accumulation of knowledge and the establishment of values
evolving from the prior productive and deductive reasoning. It tests whether
something actually is. Empirically testing the PDI model, a study by Lloyd
and Scott (1994) analysed the think-aloud protocols of engineering designers
for generative, deductive and evaluative reasoning and concluded that
reasoning types interact and that generative-deductive-inductive sequences
occur during design activity; however, they also found other sequences of
reasoning. More recently, the PDI model has been criticised for proposing
design to explicitly concern generalisation through inductive reasoning
(Koskela, Paavola, & Kroll, 2018) and to draw overtly from the abductive,
deductive, inductive reasoning cycles used in scientiﬁc discovery (Magnani,
2004). Hence, there is reason to question the validity of inductive reasoning
to have a speciﬁc role in design reasoning.
In a study, Galle (1996a) empirically analysed design reasoning through the
use of replication protocol analysis by asking an expert architect to replicate
the interpreted reasoning underlying other people’s work. Using such analysis,
he found patterns of inference corresponding to abductive and deductive
reasoning and argues that deductive reasoning can be productive and intro-
duce new elements to a design. He further observed that design reasoning is
occasionally opportunistic and based on beliefs and therefore does not neces-
sarily reach a strict, formal, logical conclusion as per the premises acting as the
basis for reasoning.
In the theory of reﬂective practice, Sch€on (1991) proposes a perspective on
design activity. Acknowledging that design contains logical design patterns
consisting of ‘if. then’ propositions that occur in cumulative sequences
from prior decisions, Sch€on emphasises the diﬀerent contextual norms drawn
by the domains of diﬀerent stakeholders involved in design. The process of
design, in Sch€on’s perspective, is a practice involving naming, framing, moving
and reflecting in cycles converging towards problem understanding and mov-
ing towards a solution (Sch€on, 1991). First, naming focuses explicitly on a part
of the design task. Second, framing guides subsequent activity by providing a
way for individuals and teams alike to ‘see’ and shape the design problem.
Third, moving generates solutions to solve the problem set by the frame.
Fourth, reflecting evaluates moves relating to their desirability. A study byDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
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design team managing both framing and moving activity in integration led to
good team performance, thus indicating a dynamic between activities that
diverge and allowing new ways to ‘see’ in combination with the generation
of (tentative) solutions to solve, or test, a process similar to mental simulation
(Christensen & Schunn, 2009).
Using the concept of generative sensing, Dong, Garbuio, and Lovallo (2016)
describes design reasoning as a pattern of deductive and abductive reasoning
that provides diﬀerent ‘ways through the problem’ (ibid.: p 3) in the case of
design concept evaluation. Aside from ﬁnding abductive reasoning present
in evaluation, they also argue for abductive reasoning as being directed to-
wards both convergent and divergent thinking, i.e., proposing both new
frames of understanding as ways of reaching conclusions. Dong, Lovallo,
and Mounarath (2015) also analysed the verbal protocols of reasoning pro-
cesses among people discussing and evaluating design ideas and concepts in
terms of the deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning types, showing
that reasoning can be reliably identiﬁed from protocols including recorded dia-
logue in groups of people. They found that the type of reasoning dominant
when evaluating ideas inﬂuenced the evaluation of the ideas. Abductive
reasoning for evaluating tended to result in more ideas being accepted, while
the opposite was true for deductive reasoning used for evaluation. Conse-
quently, they argue for further debating and analysing empirical reasoning,
as opposed to theoretical observations on reasoning in design from a logical
perspective.
An alternative model of design is proposed by Hatchuel and Weil (2008).
Concept-knowledge (CeK) emphasises the interplay between what is conjec-
tured or unknown and what is known or in existence, and it describe the op-
erators between concept and knowledge. One such operator is between
knowledge and thus consist of logical reasoning (akin to that proposed by
Peirce). Other operators allow for the making of concepts and assessing
them through available (accepted) knowledge or, conversely, using knowledge
to inform and generate new concepts. Hence, CeK theory suggests a dynamic
between ways of thinking that are tentative and that which is accepted, factual
or otherwise taken for granted.1.4 Patterns of reasoning in design
The reviewed models and studies of design activity all describe the activity as
going through stages that enter into iterations or re-formulations towards a so-
lution. In common for all models is the notion of sequences of activity that
iterate between activities that propose a new perspective on a design task,
regardless of whether they are termed compositions, frames, or ways to
perceive on the one hand, and activities that seek to describe, predict orsign reasoning patterns 45
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models also explicitly state the existence of an activity concerning the evalua-
tion and reﬂection of the previous, this activity seems more doubtful. Thus, the
approaches have in common that they describe design activity as being itera-
tive, involving cycles of reasoning towards solutions and being a process of
learning about the problem through the generation of solutions, resulting in
the co-evolution of problem and solution (Dorst & Cross, 2001).
Despite the relative agreement in the models that design activity iterates be-
tween hypothesis generation and exploration, there are results showing that
the underlying reasoning types in some cases function in discordance with their
strictly formal deﬁnitions. An example of this is the arguments by Galle
(1996a) that deductive reasoning does in some cases produce new solutions,
or that abductive reasoning is also prevalent in the evaluation of design con-
cepts (Dong et al., 2016). Pertaining to design activity, Rittel (1987) argues
that there is no clear separation between problem deﬁnition, synthesis and
evaluation in real-world design activity and that ‘only at the micro-level can
we identify patterns of reasoning corresponding to [the design process]’
(Rittel, 1987, p. 3).1.5 Analysing micro-level reasoning in design
As shown in the above review of the existing research on reasoning in design,
little or no research has been done on the reasoning patterns present at the
micro-level of design activity comprising the inference made at the level of in-
dividual arguments between groups of designers. Research is therefore desired
to identify and understand reasoning patterns within arguments e what this
study deﬁnes as micro-level design activity (Dong et al., 2015; Rittel, 1987).
The decision to analyse micro-level reasoning implies parting with the thus-
far established perception of reasoning as containing premises, rules and con-
clusions. The present approach allows for analysing entire reasoning patterns
whereas the previous studies determine a single type of reasoning. Arguably,
this allows for a more ﬁne-grained understanding of how design activity takes
place.
Synthesising the above review, the paper proposes to empirically test whether
the characteristics of design activity show a pattern if interpreted as a
reasoning process. Departing from the above-described formal deﬁnitions of
deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning as distinct types and combining
that with the reviewed models of design activity, a process of reasoning in
design would involve 1) abductive reasoning that leads to a problem setting
by framing and suggesting functions, followed by 2) deductive reasoning
that concretises the solution and predicts its eﬀects on the problem set. Finally,
a more debated phase might involve inductive reasoning that evaluates design
activity. The two-stage process is similar to a deﬁnition from the ﬁeld ofDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
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stage process involving the ‘.use [of] some constraints to generate a putative
solution, and other constraints, such as the goal of the problem, to criticise and
amend the results’ (Johnson-Laird, 2009).
Based on results from above reviewed studies of reasoning in design, design
activity, and consequently design reasoning, is not expected to follow the
two-stage process in a strict and homogeneous way. Nonetheless, the com-
monalities explained above across models of design activity invites investiga-
tion into the degree to which such a pattern of abductive-deductive
reasoning does indeed exist and what the role of inductive reasoning might be.1.6 Idea generation as an instance of design activity
A speciﬁc stage of the design process is the generation of design ideas whereby
new ideas are put forward and explored. Dictionaries commonly deﬁne ideas
as concerning 1) an imagined outcome, 2) a course of action and 3) the basis on
which something is believed to be valid (Merriam-Webster; Oxford). Hence,
perceiving ideas as a process of inference is consonant with the above descrip-
tions of the reasoning processes underpinning design activity because the
notion of an idea contains a setting and/or proposition for an imagined
outcome as well as a description towards an actual solution. The early stage
of idea generation provides a way to investigate the proposed abductive-
deductive patterns within short time intervals, allowing for a higher number
of episodes suitable for analysing patterns in reasoning.
Furthermore, idea generation designates a key part of the design process
(Cross, 2001) that regards the formulation of, and trade-oﬀs between, issues
of key design features (Ahmed, Wallace, & Blessing, 2003; Bucciarelli,
2002). Hence, design idea generation is deemed a suitable unit of analysis to
investigate reasoning behaviour notwithstanding the potential representativity
to design activity in general.
Finally, to arrive at a practical approach to analysing the three-stage reasoning
process in a context of idea generation, a simpliﬁed separation of ideas into
three equal parts is done. This will allow for the analysis of speciﬁc concentra-
tions of reasoning types at diﬀerent stages of design activity. The speciﬁc divi-
sion into three parts is grounded in the prevalence of models of design activity
that concern two or more stages of design. While the greatest agreement
among these is that of abductive-deductive patterns, as discussed above, there
is some disagreement as to the role of evaluation in design activity. Hence, a
three-part division of ideas will allow for a greater resolution for analysing
reasoning occurrences as ideas develop and also leave room for investigating
whether any unexpected patterns of reasoning occur during the end of ideas.sign reasoning patterns 47
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The study aims to understand empirical design reasoning in a context of group
design activity in the context of idea generation. The aim is pursued in two
ways: ﬁrst, by testing a set of hypotheses regarding a proposed abductive-
deductive pattern with regard to the verbal deployment of reasoning among
groups of designers. Second, the study aims to show and discuss how
reasoning occurs at the micro-level of design activity. This is done through
the use of examples to illustrate the reasoning patterns identiﬁed in group
idea generation.
Pertaining to the ﬁrst aim, a set of two hypotheses predict a distribution of
reasoning in idea generation resulting from the analysis of reasoning in design
and models of design activity.
H1: Abductive (compared to deductive) reasoning is relatively concentrated in
the first part of the verbal realisation of an idea.
H2: Deductive (compared to abductive) reasoning is relatively concentrated in
the middle part of the verbal realisation of an idea.
Finally, a more tentative and exploratory question is posed as to the role of
inductive reasoning. While not expected to be prominent in idea generation
as it is evaluative (de Bono, 1992), there is an expectation that any inductive
reasoning present will be more pronounced in the last parts of generated ideas.
The hypotheses concern an analysis of the proportional distribution of
reasoning within design ideas as a unit of analysis, divided in three parts. A
ﬁrst part of abductive reasoning that serves to state an intention or desired
result by conjecturing that a speciﬁc aspect of the design task is relevant.
Next, there is a middle part of deductive reasoning, indicating the concretisa-
tion of solutions framed by the initial hypothesis. Finally, the last part of
reasoning is more uncertain, in some cases described as being evaluative
through induction (March, 1976) Because this model is contested (Koskela
et al., 2018), we refrain from making deﬁnitive hypotheses about what type
of reasoning is more prevalent in the last parts of ideas; however, we venture
an exploratory question as to the role of inductive reasoning. Together, the hy-
potheses predict that idea generation design reasoning follows an abductive-
deductive pattern through the ideas generated. As argued above, ideas repre-
sent an instantiation of design activity, thus allowing the use of individual idea
episodes as a basis for determining reasoning patterns that go through the pro-
posed two-stage process within a limited timeframe. Rittel (1987) proposes
that the reasoning patterns in design activity are disorderly. Thus, the hypoth-
eses do not predict a strict adherence to an abductive-deductive pattern butDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Empirically analysing derather predict that each reasoning type is concentrated at speciﬁc parts of
ideas.
Pertaining to the second aim of the study, a qualitative analysis of the
reasoning patterns found in the data is conducted to ﬂesh out the implications
of the quantitative analysis obtained by testing the hypotheses.3 Method
The study collected data from ﬁve teams of three members working on idea
generation for the same design task. Protocol coding of transcribed recordings
was used as the basis for analysing the data.
3.1 Data collection
An experiment was designed for teams of participants from industry engaged
in idea generation to perform a speciﬁc design task. The participants volun-
teered to take part in the experiment as part of an innovation workshop.
The participants were from diﬀerent companies and industry sectors. Nine
participants were female, and six were male. Table 1 summarises the details
pertaining to the participants.
A study by Ahmed et al. (2003) found diﬀerences in reasoning activities be-
tween novice and experienced designers, warranting data collection focusing
on the design activity of experienced professionals since this is more represen-
tative of actual design activity and behaviour than e.g., that of novices or stu-
dents. Regarding the number of participants in the analysis, the argument is
twofold. First, obtaining industry professionals is a barrier in terms of obtain-
ing a high number of participants; however, for the reasons outlined above, we
preferred to use students; and second, the data segmentation and qualitative
coding method approaches 6000 segments, which would be unmanageable
and highly time consuming if it were much larger.
Prior to the idea generation session, an introduction to the design task was
provided by the main author. Next, teams were generated at random to
form ﬁve teams of three participants each.
To make the design task understandable for participants of varying back-
grounds, it focused on the generation of ideas for radically reducing water con-
sumption at a local hotel. To match the backgrounds of the participants, the
design task emphasised the generation of ideas concerning not only technical
solutions but also organisational or behavioural ideas, or combinations
thereof. The task was formulated by an industry company with a commercial
interest in the subject matter of the task before the experiment to ensure the
relevance to real life industrial design practice. No participants of the study
were from this company.sign reasoning patterns 49
Table 1 Background details of participants
Participant information Previous working experience
Participant Group Gender Industry sector Years of
experience
Problem
solving
Technical
design
Creative
methods
1 1 M Energy 27 X X X
2 1 F Higher education 7 X X
3 1 F Telecommunication 41 X X
4 2 M Logistics 20 X X X
5 2 F Finance 19 X X
6 2 F Publishing 25 X X
7 3 F Graphical design 1 X X X
8 3 M Publishing 35 X X
9 3 M Logistics 40 X X
10 4 F Higher education 10 X
11 4 F Public administration 17 X X X
12 4 M Organisation 15 X X
13 5 M Healthcare 23 X X
14 5 F Pharma 20 X X
15 5 F Insurance 14 X X
Average [ 20.9
[SD [ 11.5]
93% 27% 100%
50The team began with a 10-min period to become familiar with the design task
and the idea generation process. The period involved discussions between the
facilitators and the participants on practical details as well as informal talk and
socialisation in the teams. After this, the teams generated ideas, spending
20 min using the three creative methods: brainstorming, random Images and
bio-cards. The idea generation methods were intended to create variation
over the course of the idea generation sessions. The participants were provided
with paper for taking notes or sketching. Table 2 presents the creative methods
used for idea generation.
The ﬁve teams underwent the idea generation in parallel, in separate rooms. A
graduate student of design engineering facilitated each team, instructing the
participants to a) allow individual idea generation but ensure that ideas are
presented and discussed as a group; b) build on the ideas generated by others,
if relevant; and c) ensure timekeeping. The facilitators were blind to the hy-
potheses and aims of the study, and they followed a printed protocol to ensure
that the teams adhered to the time schedule and activities. In some instances,
the facilitator contributed to the discussion to ensure that the teams did not get
stuck in generating ideas. Since the facilitators were blind to the purpose of the
study, their involvement did not interfere with the natural dialogue occurring
in the teams.
For all teams, brainstorming was the ﬁrst method, after which the ordering of
the random images and bio-cards methods were presented in random order to
avoid any ordering eﬀects caused by ideas generated using previous methodsDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Table 2 Creative methods used by teams to generate ideas
Method Idea generation with no
instructions
Random images Bio-cards
Description Teams were instructed to
brainstorm together to
generate ideas, following
the principles of
generating many ideas
and withholding criticism
(Osborn, 1953).
Each team was given six
random images from a
catalogue of 100 random
images drawn from the
past research on idea
generation in design
(Christensen, 2010).
Images relating to water
or nature were not used in
the pool from which the
images were drawn to
avoid overlap with bio-
cards.
Each team was given six
bio-cards created using
the Ask Nature
Biomimicry Taxonomy
(Ask Nature). Six
functions were picked at
random from taxonomy
functions relating to
water, including functions
relating to ﬁltering,
transporting, collecting
and optimising water
(consumption).
Empirically analysing dethat included providing the participants with inspirational material. The facil-
itators began each method with a short introduction, after which the partici-
pants began generating ideas.
Video and audio recordings were used to collect the data of the idea generation
process, resulting in a total of 5 h and 36 min of video of design interaction
from the ﬁve teams (varying from 62 to 73 min per team).3.2 Analysis method
The data were analysed using protocol analyses of concurrent verbalisation.
Protocol analysis of design activity is appropriate to understand underlying
cognitive processes such as reasoning, with minimal interruption of the re-
corded process (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Consequently, verbal protocol ana-
lyses of practitioners from industry is relevant and expected to be highly
representative of design cognition found in practice (Ahmed et al., 2003;
Chi, 1997; Christensen & Ball, 2014). In this case, as the observations were
in teams, no forced or primed instructions for the participants to think-
aloud were given, resulting in a minimum of interference with thought
processes.
The idea generation sessions were transcribed. To analyse these protocols of
verbal data in depth, qualitative coding was considered to be a viable method
(Chi, 1997). To prepare for the coding of reasoning at a micro-level, segmen-
tation was completed according to word phrases to allow the individual coding
of utterances of the shortest possible meaningful length (Goldschmidt, 2009).
Next, a two-step coding scheme was developed to analyse the segmented
protocols.sign reasoning patterns 51
Table 3 Code names and defin
Code name
idea Idea c
partic
idea aspect Idea a
previo
also a
52The ﬁrst step of analysing the protocols involved the identiﬁcation of the ideas
uttered by the teams. Table 3 presents the code names and deﬁnitions.
As ideas involve solutions and sub-solutions (idea aspects) (Badke-schaub
et al., 2007), it is necessary to perceive ideas as being put forward in a distrib-
uted manner, and at diﬀerent levels of abstraction (Voss, 2006). More than one
participant can contribute to the generation of ideas. Consequently, the pro-
tocols do not distinguish complete uninterrupted utterance sequences but
groups of utterances relating to an idea put forward and related aspects of
that idea. This group of segments is referred to as an idea episode (Chi,
1997). To test the hypotheses, each idea episode was separated into three parts.
The ﬁrst part is the ﬁrst part of the idea episode, counted by reasoning occur-
rences, rounded down. The same procedure was applied for the last part but
using the last part of reasoning occurrences in an idea episode, rounded
down. The remaining reasoning occurrences are assigned to the middle part.
Table 4 presents the deﬁnitions of the reasoning types used to code for
reasoning, derived from the literature review on the three reasoning types.
The deﬁnitions were chosen to reﬂect the central characteristics of the three
reasoning types, at their core describing the diﬀerent ways of reaching a
conclusion from premises. The interpretation of the coding deﬁnitions in-
structed the coder to code by establishing the ‘form’ of each utterance. This
was necessary to code for the actual way in which each reasoning utterance
was presented to the team to avoid coding the implicit meanings behind an ut-
terance instead, which would not be in keeping with the principles of coding
verbal reasoning as argued in section 1.2:
a The reasoning utterance reﬂects the deployment of a mental model that
might be diﬀerent from the ones held by those addressed (Badke-
schaub et al., 2007; Johnson-Laird, 1983)
b The verbal enactment of reasoning is inﬂuenced by values and beliefs and
in turn acts to propose a certain perspective (Dong, 2007; Stumpf &
McDonnell, 2002)
The segment length used here to code for reasoning deviates from other re-
viewed empirical studies of reasoning (e.g., Dong et al., 2016; Galle, 1996a;itions for ideas used in the first step of coding scheme
Definition
oded segments are the un-interrupted sequence of utterances put forward by a
ipant proposing an idea.
spect coded segments are the utterances following idea codes but relating to the
us idea. Aspects of an idea can be multiple and stated by all participants. Aspects can
ppear after breaks in the sequence of idea-related utterances.
Design Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Table 4 Code names and definitions for reasoning types used in the second step of coding scheme (reference removed for blind
review)
Reasoning code Coding definitions
Abduction  A hypothesis to account for what is desired or intended (Roozenburg, 1993)
 Creating ideas (to a problem) from imagination (Johnson-Laird, 2009)
 A belief held without proof or certain knowledge (Schurz, 2007)
 Preliminary guess to introduce hypotheses (Fann, 1970)
Deduction  Deﬁnitive and certain conclusion (Schurz, 2007)
 Explicating hypothesis by suggesting consequences (Fann, 1970)
 Prediction of result in a given frame (Fann, 1970)
 Proves something must be (March, 1976)
 Explores consequences of an abduction (Fann, 1970)
Induction  Tests a hypothesis with available data (Schurz, 2007)
 Generalises from speciﬁc instance or idea (Reichertz, 2010)
 Evaluates if something is operative (Fann, 1970)
 Inferring from observed to unobserved (Schurz, 2007)
 Inferring about future courses of events (Johnson-Laird, 2009)
Empirically analysing deLloyd & Scott, 1994) as well as reviewed conceptual models (e.g., Dorst, 2011;
Roozenburg, 1993) in that the segments (word phrases) do not in themselves
contain explicit premises, rules and conclusions. Rather, the coding of the
reasoning for such short segments is a consequence of the aim to analyse the
reasoning at a micro-level (Rittel, 1987) in which each reasoning segment is
dependent on the reasoning pattern (episode) into which it enters. This implies
that each micro-level reasoning occurrence can be distinguished and analysed
to more accurately describe reasoning patterns.
The coding of reasoning types was restricted to the idea episodes coded in the
ﬁrst step of the coding process because the focus is on the inferences made dur-
ing the generation of ideas.
Cohen’s Kappa was calculated for inter-coder reliability after each of the cod-
ing steps (Cohen, 1968). The ﬁrst and third author coded 460 segments for idea
and idea aspect, reaching a Kappa of .71, and 353 segments for reasoning,
reaching a Kappa of .61. Both scores are considered ‘high’ (Fleiss, 1981) or
‘substantial’ (Landis & Koch, 1977) and justify the reliability of the coding
scheme. The Kappa does not reveal where the speciﬁc disagreements come
from; however, a qualitative analysis shows that for idea and idea aspect cod-
ing, no particular combination of disagreement stands out. For reasoning cod-
ing, the primary source of disagreement came from the deduction code, where
the second coder tended to code fewer occurrences of the code, while the ﬁrst
coder would code more instances of the code. Since the disagreements
occurred in common appearances of multiple deduction codes in a series of un-
interrupted segments, the source of error was adapted to reﬁne the code deﬁ-
nition for coding the remaining protocols. Disagreements among the coders
were discussed, and a common decision was made as to which code to apply.sign reasoning patterns 53
Table 5 Summary of coding r
Coded reasoning
544 Results
This section presents the results of the analysis. First, the results of the coding
provide an overview of the protocol data and the results of the hypotheses.
Second, two examples from the protocols illustrate the coding scheme and
describe the reasoning patterns found at an individual idea level.
4.1 Summary of protocol coding results
The protocols counted 5792 segments of which 2047 (35%) were idea episodes,
i.e., utterances relating to the generation of an idea. Other segments were not
determined to concern the generation of ideas in addition to other utterances
such as reﬂection on the design task and social conversation. Idea episodes
contained 1698 (83%) reasoning segments, distributed in 218 ideas in total.
Table 5 summarises the results.
As observed from the above, deductive reasoning is the most frequent, ac-
counting for 72% of all reasoning, while abductive reasoning is the second
most frequent type of reasoning accounting for 21%.
4.2 Reasoning patterns in idea episodes
The hypotheses predict the following development of reasoning patterns in
idea episodes.
 H1 predicts a concentration of abductive reasoning in the beginning parts
of ideas generated, serving to state an intention or desired result by conjec-
turing that a speciﬁc aspect of the design task is relevant.
 H2 predicts that deductive reasoning is concentrated in the middle parts of
ideas generated, indicating the concretisation of solutions framed by the
initial hypothesis.
Figure 1 illustrates the progression of reasoning distribution across the three
parts of ideas.
To test the hypotheses, a series ofWilcoxon signed-rank tests are completed. A
non-parametric test is applied since the proportional distributions of
reasoning in the three idea episode parts are not generally distributed; howev-
er, it does show a symmetrical shape in diﬀerences among the groups, i.e., the
diﬀerence of reasoning proportions among each reasoning type across the ﬁrst,esults
Abductive Deductive Inductive
Count 349 1226 123
Proportion 21% 72% 7%
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Figure 1 Proportional distri-
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Table 6 Results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of hypotheses
Reasoning type Tested groups Z N Significance
Abductive First part, middle part 5.698 203 p < .001
First part, last part 6.716 203 p < .001
Deductive Middle part, ﬁrst part 4.984 203 p < .001
Middle part, last part 1.090 203 p ¼ .276
Inductive Last part, ﬁrst part 1.841 203 p ¼ .066
Last part, middle part 1.397 203 p ¼ .162
56middle and last parts of ideas. Table 6 presents the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
necessary to test hypotheses.
Pertaining to the hypotheses, it was found that:
 Abductive reasoning accounts for 37% of total reasoning in the ﬁrst part of
ideas and signiﬁcantly decreases to 20% in the middle part (Z ¼ 5.698,
p < .001) and 12% in last part (Z ¼ 6.716, p < .001), supporting H1.
 Deductive reasoning accounts for 72% of total reasoning in the middle
part, thus signiﬁcantly decreasing to 5% in middle part (Z ¼ 4.984,
p < .001), while actually increasing from the middle (72%) to the last
part (76%) (Z ¼ 1.199, p ¼ .276). This result only supports H2 from the
middle to the ﬁrst parts, while a direction opposite to what was expected
is observed from the middle to the last parts.
As for the exploratory question of the role of inductive reasoning, the results
showed that inductive reasoning accounts for 12% of total reasoning in the
last part of ideas, 9% in the middle part and 8% in the ﬁrst part.
Table 6 summarises the test results. Please note that of the 218 total ideas, 203
were of a length that allowed analysing reasoning proportions across all three
parts. Aside from the tested hypotheses, the results show that all types of
reasoning occur in all parts of ideas and that deductive reasoning is the domi-
nant type across all parts of ideas, accounting for 55%, 72% and 76% in ﬁrst,
middle and last parts, respectively.
Since the facilitators took part to a limited degree in the idea generation (287
segments coded for reasoning, equivalent to 5% of all reasoning), the propor-
tional distributions and statistical tests were re-calculated to determine any
biases in reasoning patterns caused by the facilitators (despite their being blind
to the study’s aims and hypotheses). The procedure excluded all complete idea
episodes in which a facilitator uttered any reasoning (i.e., segments by facilita-
tors coded for any of the reasoning types), resulting in a reduction of 79 idea
episodes. Pertaining to proportional distributions using the reduced data, the
results were very similar, showing diﬀerences up to 1,5%-points. A re-run ofDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Empirically analysing dethe Wilcoxon Signed Rank test conﬁrmed this by showing the same signiﬁcant
and non-signiﬁcant results as reported in Table 6. As the analysis shows, the
participation of facilitators seems not to have interfered with the results.
To further assess the reliability (R) of these results, we conducted a string of
analyses aimed at (R1) to assess if the results from the episode split into thirds
could be replicated with a mean episode split; (R2) to assess whether the results
depend on temporal development within the sessions (e.g., if abductive
reasoning happens mainly early in a session) by splitting the transcripts into
early/late parts and re-running the analyses; (R3) to test the reliability of the
results in each individual team; and (R4) to conduct the same conceptual an-
alyses at a diﬀerent grain size by looking into the temporal ordering of individ-
ual arguments within each episode (as opposed to between as in the main
analysis). (R1) All the main results could be replicated with a mean episode
split: Abductive reasoning was more prevalent in the ﬁrst half (Z ¼ 5.756,
p < .001), deductive reasoning was more prevalent in the second half
(Z ¼ 4.147, p < .001), and inductive reasoning showed an increasing, albeit
insigniﬁcant, trend (Z ¼ 1.869, p ¼ .062). (R2) Each team’s transcript was
meansplit into early/late parts. The results indicated that every analysis com-
parison had the same directionality and approximate size in each split half as
they did in the main analysis. Every analysis that was signiﬁcant in the main
result was also signiﬁcant for each transcript part, and conversely every insig-
niﬁcant main analysis was also insigniﬁcant in each transcript part. (R3) All
main results were re-run by the team to assess whether the results were driven
by a subset of teams. Splitting by team reduces power, and therefore we mainly
sought to interpret reliability based on the directionality of the results (as
opposed to the signiﬁcance levels). For abductive reasoning, all ﬁve teams
replicated a declining eﬀect from both the ﬁrst to the middle part (p’s ranging
.11 to .002) and from the ﬁrst to the last parts (p’s ranging .078 to .0001). For
deductive reasoning, both the increasing eﬀect from the ﬁrst to the middle part
(p’s ranging .14 to .0001), and the declining trend from the middle to the last
part (p’s ranging .91 to .08) were replicable in all ﬁve teams. For inductive
reasoning, the increasing trend from the ﬁrst to the last part was found for
all ﬁve teams, although always insigniﬁcant (p’s ranging .91 to .06). Less
consistent was the inductive increasing trend from the middle to the last
part as one team displayed opposite directionality, and one team showed no
diﬀerence at all. (R4) To assess whether the main results could be replicated
at a diﬀerent grain size, we conducted a reasoning pattern analysis within
the episode parts. Given the low count of inductive reasoning, we focused
on the interaction between abductive reasoning and deductive reasoning.
For each episode part, we counted the number of abductive-deductive (AD)
versus deductive-abductive (DA) sequence patterns in terms of the order of
which the reasoning types ﬁrst occurred. The three parts of the episodes
diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their reasoning patterns (c2(2) ¼ 17.43, p < .001).
Follow-up two by two chi-square analyses showed that the ﬁrst part hadsign reasoning patterns 57
Table 7 Idea episode from pro
Row Speaker
1 M But may
other in
2 M so it’s n
3 M and the
4 M but you
5 M do a de
6 M because
7 M If it just
8 M You cou
9 F Yes, it c
10 F for ever
11 M Yes, I li
12 R Oh yeah
13 R You wo
14 F Yes
15 R Yeah, a
16 R or the la
17 M Then it
18 R No, and
puriﬁca
19 M Yes
20 R And po
21 R but then
kitchen
22 R or what
58more AD than DA interactions compared to the middle part (c2(1) ¼ 17.32,
p < .001); however, they did not diﬀer from the last part (c2(1) ¼ 2.44, ns).
The middle part conversely diﬀered from the last part, displaying relatively
more DA than AD interactions (c2(1) ¼ 5.11, p < .03). These results were
replicable with an episode mean split, again showing that the ﬁrst half of the
episodes displayed relatively more AD than DA interactions, compared to
the second half (c2(1) ¼ 13.5.11, p < .03). Taken together, the main results
appear to be extremely reliable and robust across episode splitting choices,
transcript parts, teams, and choice of grainsize. The trending direction was
almost uniformly the same in the reliability checks, although the lower N re-
sulting from splitting the dataset did not always allow for signiﬁcant results.
The overall result is strong support for H1 and partial support for H2 and H3.
To determine whether the groups were internally representative of reasoning in
line with the hypotheses, all groups were analysed in relation a) to the overall
proportions of reasoning types uttered and b) to whether each group was
overly dominated by any single person and whether such persons displayed
diﬀerent reasoning patterns than expected.tocols, translated to English for reporting
Segment Idea code Reasoning
code
be you could clean the water sufﬁciently from one to the
a bathroom,
idea abduction
ot so much about returning it for wastewater treatment idea deduction
n all the way back into the infrastructure, idea deduction
take it [the water] from the shower to the toilet, idea deduction
gree that it doesn’t create too much foam, idea deduction
there are soap leftovers in, or whatever. idea deduction
ﬁlls the toilet cistern. idea deduction
ld calculate it. idea deduction
ould be that you could make a closed circuit, idea aspect abduction
y hotel room, right? idea aspect abduction
ke that. idea aspect induction
, I mean, then it’s your own ﬁlth you meet again, right? idea aspect induction
uld rather want that, than someone else’s. idea aspect induction
idea aspect
nd you could make another closed circuit in the kitchens, idea aspect abduction
undry room or the spa. idea aspect abduction
shouldn’t transport so much water at the same time. idea aspect deduction
it can be used, and you can make differentiated
tion methods.
idea aspect deduction
idea aspect
ssibly you could, if you make the., I’m don’t know how. idea aspect
you could go from drinking water to showering water to
water to cleaning water to toilet water
idea aspect deduction
ever it could be so it sort of goes down through, right? idea aspect
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Table 8 Idea episode from pro
Row Speaker
1 V An exterio
2 V that can e
3 V But well, i
4 V It’s kind o
5 V So the me
6 V I mean, it
7 V just like th
8 V Then there
9 V then the ti
10 V and then t
reservoirs,
11 V then it doe
12 V so it will b
Empirically analysing dea) Of the 15 participants, 12 (80%) adhered to the same order in terms of the
proportions of reasoning. That is, most deductive reasoning was followed
by abductive and ﬁnally inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning was
the most prevalent for all of the remaining 3 participants.
b) To address the internal distribution in the groups and whether the most
active participant would skew the results, our analysis showed that the
most active participant in each group contributed with respectively
49%, 48%, 41%, 49% and 57% of all group utterances - compared to
33% if all contributed equally, which is theoretical and not expected.
Of these 5 participants, 4 adhered to the overall reasoning ordering (as
reported above), while the last person had an equal proportion of abduc-
tive and inductive reasoning (both at 18%).
Therefore, the reasoning proportion diﬀerences at the individual group levels
seem not to interfere with the representativity of the overall results.4.3 Examples and interpretation of the coding of reasoning
Two examples are presented to illustrate the reasoning patterns identiﬁed from
the protocol analyses. This is done by showing coded data supplied with a
description of the speciﬁc sequences of reasoning occurring.4.3.1 Example 1
Table 7 presents the ﬁrst example idea episode, including example descriptions
of the code deﬁnitions used for the three reasoning types. The idea episode be-
gins with an abduction proposing a principle to reuse water (Code deﬁnition:
‘A hypothesis to account for what is desired or intended’, refer to Table 4).
Following this, a sequence of deductions occur that argue for why the speciﬁc
principle is useful by specifying that it is possible to measure the eﬀect of the
idea (rows 2e8, Table 7) (Codes: Row 2: ‘Prediction of result in a given frame’,tocols, translated to English for reporting
Segment Idea code Reasoning code
r cover [surrounding the hotel], idea deduction
asily be done. idea deduction
t absorbs the dew. idea deduction
f like a membrane within a membrane, okay. idea deduction
mbrane has these small channels, idea deduction
leads the water in these tiny channels, idea deduction
e desert rhubarb. idea deduction
are simply these rhubarb leaves forming a surface, idea deduction
ny channels leads the water, idea deduction
hey [water channels] can lead to some small, local water idea deduction
sn’t have to lead it to a large reservoir in the ground, idea deduction
e small local water reservoirs. idea deduction
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60rows 3e7: ‘Explicating hypothesis by suggesting consequences’, row 8: ‘Deﬁn-
itive and certain conclusion’). Next, the facilitator [F] expands the idea by
abduction (rows 9e10), building on the initial principle and initiating a new
aspect of the idea. This time inductive reasoning follows the abductive
reasoning by the remaining team members in the form of an evaluation of
the use experience based on personal preference (rows 11e13) (Code: Rows
11e13: ‘Inferring about future courses of events’). A team member then pro-
poses to re-contextualise the initial idea principle (rows 15e16) after which de-
ductions determine the eﬀect of the solution (row 17) and a statement (though
not explained further) that postulates that an alternative puriﬁcation method
is possible (row 18). Finally, a deduction proposes the possibility of a new prin-
ciple for reusing water (row 21).
Three immediate observations stand out from the idea episode. First, the
example shows that reasoning types occur in a pattern using all three types.
Second, concerning the evolution of the idea, all team members partake in
the elaboration of the idea through diﬀerent aspects. Third, there is an inter-
action between the diﬀerent occurrences of reasoning, both between and
within same reasoning types.4.3.2 Example 2
The second sample idea episode presented in Table 8 is an example of a purely
deductive reasoning pattern. The episode begins by proposing an object (an
exterior cover) without stating the desired outcome (Table 8, rows 1e2).
Thereafter follows the desired outcome, implicitly stated by reference to a so-
lution from the bio-card method (row 3). Then, a deductive sequence begins by
reusing the structure and principle provided by the bio-card (rows 4e12).
The example shows that reasoning patterns including only deductive reasoning
are possible, in this case by analogising from a commonly understood object
(the bio-card solution) towards a solution. Additionally, observed from the
example is the absence of abductive reasoning and that only one person con-
tributes to the idea.5 Discussion
This section discusses the results from the protocol analyses of reasoning pat-
terns. The ﬁrst part discusses the observed reasoning patterns by quantitative
analysis and by referring to observations made from the patterns of reasoning
found in speciﬁc idea episodes. The second part proposes three arguments
from the basis of the study before discussing the implications of the results
and proposes avenues of future research.Design Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Empirically analysing de5.1 Hypotheses and general reasoning patterns
As the results of H1 show, there is a signiﬁcant concentration of abductive
reasoning in the ﬁrst parts of ideas. Hence, the ﬁnding is consistent with the
reviewed models of design activity that assume an abductive stage to initiate
instances of inference-making in design activity (March, 1976; Sch€on, 1991).
H2 was only partially supported, ﬁnding deductive reasoning to increase as
an idea progresses. The surprising prevalence of deductive reasoning persists
throughout all idea parts (55e76%), while there is a signiﬁcant concentration
of abductive reasoning in the ﬁrst parts. Hence, there is support for a theoret-
ically proposed two-stage process involving abductive-deductive patterns,
with only a few occurrences of inductive reasoning and all the while dominated
by deductive reasoning across all parts of ideas. The results showed that the
exploratory question pertaining to the presence of inductive reasoning can
be negatively answered in the sense that inductive reasoning is the least prev-
alent type of reasoning. Rather, the last parts of ideas were the most concen-
trated parts of deductive reasoning.
The tests to determine any diﬀerences between groups with or without fully
experienced participants, as well as across various robustness checks, did
not show any variations of the reasoning patterns. Hence, we observe that
the reasoning patterns across many diﬀerent factors, including the experience
of the participants, temporal placement in idea generation sessions and more,
are very robust and follow abductive-deductive patterns.
The following section discusses the coded reasoning types and patterns using
speciﬁc occurrences from the above presented examples.
Abduction-coded segments tend to occur in an uncertain form that at the same
time proposes new frames or perspectives on functions to achieve to address
the design task of saving water. The frames are not absolute and are observed
to change as the idea progresses through re-framings that proposes new prob-
lem settings and aspects of ideas (Dorst & Cross, 2001; Sch€on, 1991).
Concretely, example 1 shows how a ﬁrst abduction is made (Table 7, row 1)
in which a speciﬁc perspective that can possibly lead to the saving of water
is introduced. Later, in the same example, abductions occur again to re-
frame the initial perspective (rows 9e10) and again later introduced a sub-
function to the previous (rows 15e16).
Deduction-coded segments function to derive eﬀects in response to the frames
and appear as causal inference chains that lead to a conclusion. Often, these
deductions draw on prior abductive reasoning as the premise. Further, they
do not produce guaranteed objective ‘truths’. Rather, the deductions serve
to explore and concretise the framing to amend and discern the validity of
the abduction (Johnson-Laird, 2009; Sch€on, 1991). The two examples eachsign reasoning patterns 61
62provide an explanation to the high proportion of deductive reasoning found in
the protocols. Example 1 shows that deductive reasoning can occur as a series
of deductions functioning to describe a solution (Table 7, rows 2e8) to a prior
abduction (row 1), which is similar to the notion of mental simulation (only in
a verbal form), found to be a strategy for resolving uncertainty in design activ-
ity (Christensen & Schunn, 2009). Example 2 shows a diﬀerent deductive
reasoning sequence (Table 8) that involves the analogical mapping of a solu-
tion provided by the bio-card design method to the design task at hand.
This can be interpreted as an instance of direct analogical transfer (Ahmed
& Christensen, 2009), a strategy found to be mostly used by novice designers
(ibid.). However, the example also holds similarity to the notions of explana-
tory abductive reasoning (Roozenburg, 1993) and abduction-1 type reasoning
(Dorst, 2011) in that the reasoning pattern (here coded as deductive) follows
an implicit abductive explanation that uses a known solution in a new context
resulting in a causal explanation. The diﬀerence in ways of perceiving
reasoning among the conceptual models of reasoning in design and the present
verbal reasoning approach is discussed in greater detail in section 5.2.
Induction-coded segments are shown in example 1 to occur in the form of the
informal appraisal of an idea, in the example as personal preference (Table 7,
row 11), or as a combination of evaluating the consequence of an idea and per-
sonal preference (rows 12e13). However, these are not instances of reasoning
suitable for evaluation in relation to the discussed models of design and the
formal role of inductive reasoning as the generalisation of the speciﬁc to the
general (Peirce, 1980). Rather, the empirical analysis of inductive reasoning
implies for inductive reasoning that the expression of personal preference
(e.g., the utterance ‘Yes, I like that’ found in row 11, Example 1) as part of
the verbal form of some underlying acceptance of what was previously pro-
posed. This acceptance is based on some previous knowledge or experience
or even attitude towards a speciﬁc idea. However, since the reasoning is argu-
mentative, it holds a possible importance to the dialogue as it promotes a pos-
itive attitude and agreement that might spur the continuation of other
members of a group.
However, despite the negligible role of inductive reasoning, we contend that
the observed abductive-deductive patterns (discussed at length in section
5.2) in part makes up for the lack of evaluation through mental simulation
(Christensen & Schunn, 2009). That is, for deductive reasoning, the utterances
put forward (often in sequences) that are assumed to ‘explicate’ and explore an
insight from the premise provided one possible consequence of a premise (or
frame). Thus, this one possible solution is not without importance since it
would continue to be one of the more relevant solutions to a proposed frame
(assuming that uttered ideas are better than ideas never put forward by anyone
in a team). In turn, such solution would then satisfy the need for exploring a
given frame, thus simulating and evaluating an idea. Indeed, similar studies ofDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Empirically analysing dedesign reasoning have found deductive reasoning to be evaluative (Dong et al.,
2015) in relation to ideas.5.2 Verbal reasoning in idea generation processes
Drawing from the results of the tested hypotheses and the observations made
from the ideas episodes, we make three primary arguments and discuss their
implications and the need for future research. The ﬁrst argument is that
abductive-deductive sequences are a central component of micro-level design
activity. The second is that empirically analysing reasoning necessitates
perceiving reasoning patterns unlike those proposed in conceptual proposals
of reasoning in design. The third is that verbal reasoning is indicative of the
mental models held by individuals. In the following section, the implications
of the study’s results for design practice are discussed.
5.2.1 Abductive-deductive patterns dominate design idea
generation
First, pertaining to the reasoning pattern observed from the analysis of the
proportional distribution, and tested by the hypotheses, we argue that an
abductive-deductive pattern is appropriate for describing design activity in a
context of idea generation, which is similar to what Roozenburg and Cross
(1991) describe as analysis-synthesis cycles, or as the operation between
concept and knowledge domains, as proposed by CeK theory (Hatchuel &
Weil, 2008). As such, the reasoning types enter into patterns of inference
that interact among abductive reasoning, found to be signiﬁcantly concen-
trated at the beginning of ideas, and deductive reasoning is concentrated in
the later parts of ideas but dominant throughout. Abductive reasoning pro-
poses frames or perspectives for addressing the main design task, while deduc-
tive reasoning in turn explores how such a frame is viable to actually address
the design task through simulation and thus allows determining the validity of
solutions (Johnson-Laird, 2009; Lloyd & Scott, 1994). This process then re-
peats or iterates, resulting in variations of the original frames, as exempliﬁed
by Table 7, rows 1e10. As such, we contend that the abductive-deductive cy-
cles of reasoning without any explicit inductive reasoning to evaluate are not
indicative of aimless activity. Rather, the cycles show similarity to what several
models of design propose as a core tenet to design e the ability to quickly
iterate among phases that are divergent and convergent, whether deﬁned as
mental simulation (Christensen & Schunn, 2009), generative sensing (Dong
et al., 2016) or composition and decomposition (March, 1976). Aside from
showing the presence of such patterns empirically, the present study contrib-
utes by showing how diﬀerent reasoning types interact and are interdependent,
as further discussed below.
As the empirical data analysed in the present study focuses on idea generation
activity, the future research should focus on analysing reasoning patterns insign reasoning patterns 63
64similar ways during other stages of design activity, e.g., concept development
or detail design, to ascertain whether the same disorderly and opportunistic
behaviour are present, and whether the abductive-deductive pattern is still a
pronounced component of design activity. Work exists in this regard (see
Ball, Evans, Dennis, & Ormerod, 1997; Visser, 1994) but draws conclusions
based on analysing design activity in segments larger than treated here and
as such does not allow for analysis of how inferences are made at a micro-
level. Further, the research in this avenue is limited to instances of design ac-
tivity whereby group design and argumentation among people naturally oc-
curs to satisfy the presently applied methodological approach.5.2.2 Micro-level design activity contains interactions
between reasoning types
Second, as the results show, the applied coding scheme ascertains reasoning
patterns at a micro-level of design activity and allows describing the processes
involved in generating ideas in great detail. While a prominent abductive-
deductive pattern exists, the presented examples of idea episodes show how
reasoning types occur in chains of reasoning in diﬀerent types and in disor-
derly patterns that do not necessarily adhere to formal reasoning types. These
interactions among reasoning types further show that each individual instance
of reasoning (at the coded micro-level) is interdependent to the other instances
in which it is put forward e regardless of whether it is from the same person.
Hence, a micro-level analysis of reasoning such as this then improves the un-
derstanding of design activity (Rittel, 1987) by showing the how diﬀerent
reasoning types interact by drawing conclusions using diﬀerent patterns of
inference, for example, the use of deductive reasoning to arrive at a solution
under a given framing or the use of inductive reasoning to evaluate a framing
with no presence of deductive reasoning. Such observations imply that design
activity does not follow a strictly logical form but is also informal and com-
prises un-structured and opportunistic activities (Ball & Ormerod, 1995). As
also shown, these activities are shared, showing a resemblance to the concept
of shared cognition (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010) or team mental
models (Dong, Kleinsmann, & Deken, 2013), which are indicators of the abil-
ity of groups to successfully work together. Further research is necessary in
this direction to better understand how diﬀerent types of reasoning behaviour,
e.g., using diﬀerent patterns, inﬂuences the solutions generated. One possible
approach to this is the use of linkography (Goldschmidt, 2014) or similar
means to identify inﬂuences among ideas and to determine the quality of
generated ideas (Kudrowitz & Wallace, 2012).
The analysis method applied in the research is based on the proposal that
micro-level, argumentative, reasoning is key to understand design activity
(Rittel, 1987). While other reviewed studies of design reasoning apply diﬀerent
methodologies, interpretations of reasoning and/or unit of analysis (e.g., DongDesign Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Empirically analysing deet al., 2015; Galle, 2002; Lloyd & Scott, 1994), we do not presume our method
to replace such methods. Rather, our approach allows a diﬀerent perspective
on reasoning in idea generation speciﬁcally. The micro-level perspective on
design reasoning oﬀered here has the advantage of capturing reasoning as it
is actually put forward to other members in a design team; however, it is
limited in that it does not capture implicit, or taken for granted, common un-
derstandings in a team. The study thus oﬀers an alternative interpretation of
reasoning in design activity that is in contrast to existing conceptual models
of design reasoning (Dorst, 2011; March, 1976; Roozenburg, 1993)as well as
other empirical studies of reasoning (Galle, 1996a; Lloyd & Scott, 1994).5.2.3 Verbal reasoning is argumentative
Third, acknowledging that verbal reasoning is inﬂuenced by values and inten-
tions (Roozenburg, 1993; Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002) and that verbal
reasoning is a process of argumentation (Rittel, 1987) that enacts design and
thus inﬂuences design activity (Dong, 2007), we argue that the reasoning ana-
lysed here is inherently subjective and non-monotonous (McDonnell, 2012).
This implies that while one participant in group design activity may use deduc-
tive reasoning because an inference ﬁts a held mental model, the same infer-
ence may not be ‘true’ and thus is not suitable for deductive inference, in
the group mental model, or with another participant. Therefore, the reasoning
used during group design activity has a dual function of both making infer-
ences towards the generation of new ideas and also being indicative of the
mental models held by the members of that group, regardless of whether
they are shared by other group members. Hence, reasoning is argumentative,
underscoring the importance of the performative aspect of verbal reasoning
when empirically analysing design activity. One approach to further investi-
gate the argumentative aspect of design reasoning is the analysis of the mental
models held among the members of design teams in correlation with identiﬁed
reasoning patterns (Badke-schaub et al., 2007). Such an analysis could provide
insights into how coordinated or shared a group’s understanding of a design
task is, which is shown to inﬂuence performance (ibid.).5.2.4 Implications for design practice
For design practice, the results of the study provide a basis for understanding
the cognitive processes involved in group idea generation and has at least two
implications. First, the results can be used to develop AI tools to monitor and
diagnose the dialogue among groups engaged in design activity and to make
suggestions for changes to behaviour to intervene if, e.g., detected reasoning
sequences do not adhere to abductive-deductive patterns. Second, the study
has implications for the development of new, creative methods for idea gener-
ation as such methods should support the abovementioned abductive-
deductive patterns. In particular, as the study ﬁnds empirical evidence for
the centrality of abductive-deductive patterns in all part of ideas in the earlysign reasoning patterns 65
66stages of idea generation, the implications are that such creativity methods
should support and allow deductive reasoning to be made in a dynamic and
productive interaction with abductive reasoning rather than promoting divi-
sion, meaning that abductive reasoning comes ﬁrst, only allowing deductive
reasoning at later stages (i.e., by only focusing on new idea perspective at ﬁrst
without allowing the utilisation of group resources to explore those ideas until
later stages). Hence, the abductive-deductive dynamic can be seen as similar to
hermeneutic circles or experiential learning allowing groups of designers to
learn about how to generate solutions and re-interpret design tasks even at
the micro-level of early stage design activity.
Finally, the development of methods or tools to support reasoning in design
practice must allow for the inherently argumentative characteristic of design.
Hence, such methods should focus on making designers explicate their beliefs
and test their assumptions. This could, for example, be done through the
development of automated tools to monitor and diagnose design activity in
relation to espoused reasoning patterns. Such tools could potentially support
and intervene in design activity in situ.5.3 LIMITATIONS
The present study of reasoning in design draws from empirical data from idea
generation activity. Hence, the implications primarily concern such idea gen-
eration activity. However, as the hypotheses draw on models of design activity
in general, the study allows for observations to be made on design activity in
general. This is primarily done in the explanation and discussion of the exam-
ples in the study. To further qualify these observations, the paper also relates
them to other behaviours of importance to design activity such as the use of
mental simulations (B.T. Christensen & Schunn, 2009) or analysis-synthesis
(Roozenburg, 1993). To address the generalisability of the research, further
research is necessary at other stages of design activity.
Further, the study’s design limits the making of observations or conducting
analyses as to whether certain patterns or characteristics of verbal reasoning
lead to greater value or eﬀectiveness in idea generation activity than others.
Future studies should analyse reasoning patterns to reliable outcome measures
to idea ‘quality’, which in turn would make it possible to develop methods or
tools that promote such beneﬁcial reasoning behaviour.
There is a relatively low number of participants in the study (15 participants
divided into ﬁve teams). However, as argued above, the level of segmentation
of the protocols becomes unmanageable if it is much larger. A possible remedy
is to code for reasoning in larger segments, which has already been done else-
where (see Galle, 1996b; Lloyd & Scott, 1994).Design Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Empirically analysing deThe limited participation of the facilitators in the idea generation could poten-
tially aﬀect the results. To account for this, analyses of the data excluding idea
episodes in which the facilitators contributed to reasoning were completed and
showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences and the same directionality in the results.
To capture the diﬀerent reasoning types, the coding scheme is dependent on
reasoning made verbally explicit to ascertain reasoning patterns. Hence, the
study captures reasoning as it is put forward in an argumentative form
(Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1973) in a group
setting without instructional priming to think-aloud, which, we argue, is repre-
sentative of the actual verbal reasoning taking place within groups of people in
design activity (Rittel, 1987). Future research might attempt to instruct partic-
ipants to clarify all their arguments to assess whether any individual covert
reasoning arguments may be made explicit upon instruction.6 Conclusion
An empirical study of the reasoning types used in group idea generation for a
design task was conducted with participants from industry. Five teams were
recorded, and the transcribed protocols were analysed using a coding scheme
for determining the presence of ideas and reasoning types in verbal data in
more than 5500 segments. The study aimed to empirically analyse verbal
reasoning patterns through the analysis of protocol data.
The results suggest that reasoning in design activity across hundreds of ideas
follow a general pattern of abductive-deductive reasoning. The study found
that abductive reasoning is concentrated in the ﬁrst part of ideas, functioning
to frame and propose solutions. Deductive reasoning, concentrated in the
latter two parts of ideas, was the most frequent across all idea parts, func-
tioning to explore and concretise the solutions proposed by the initial, often
abductive, framing. Inductive reasoning, the least frequent of the reasoning
types, did not appear to have a pronounced eﬀect in idea generation activity.
At the individual idea level, reasoning patterns were found to be disorderly but
to contain elements of abductive-deductive patterns.
The study found that reasoning instances are understood as chains of inference
that accumulate and create understanding of approaches to address overall
problem settings in design, indicating that the analysis of reasoning patterns
at a micro-level of design activity holds potential to advance the understanding
of design activity and be applied to develop support tools and methods given
future research.
This study contributes to an understanding of design activity at a micro-level
in a real-world setting. From the protocol analysis of design teams, patterns of
verbal reasoning during idea episodes were identiﬁed. The study is novel insign reasoning patterns 67
68that it proposes an approach to analyse reasoning patterns at the micro-level
of design activity, allowing for the identiﬁcation of central abductive-
deductive patterns of reasoning from empirical data, paving the way for
several strands of future research.Acknowledgment
The authors acknowledge the support of the industry practitioners
participating in the study and the graduate students acting as facilitators.
We appreciate the comprehensive and constructive feedback from the re-
viewers helping to make the paper ready for publication. This research did
not receive any speciﬁc grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial,
or non-for-proﬁt sectors.References
Ahmed, S., & Christensen, B. T. (2009). An in situ study of analogical reasoning
in novice and experienced design engineers. Journal of Mechanical Design,
131(11). 111004-1e9.
Ahmed, S., Wallace, K., & Blessing, L. (2003). Understanding the diﬀerences be-
tween how novice and experienced designers approach design tasks. Research
in Engineering Design, 14, 1e11.
AskNature. (n.d.). AskNature bio-mimicry taxonomy. Retrieved January 10,
2016, from http://www.asknature.org/article/view/biomimicry_taxonomy
Badke-schaub, P., Lauche, K., Neumann, A., & Ahmed, S. (2007a). Task e team
e process: Assessment and analysis of the development of shared representa-
tions in an engineering team. In J. McDonnell, & P. LLoyd (Eds.), About:
Designing. Analysing design meetings. Leiden, The Netherlands: CRC Press/
Balkema.
Badke-Schaub, P., Neumann, A., Lauche, K., & Mohammed, S. (2007b). Mental
models in design teams: A valid approach to performance in design collabora-
tion? CoDesign, 3(1), 5e20.
Ball, L. J., Evans, J. S. B. T., Dennis, I., & Ormerod, T. C. (1997). Problem-solv-
ing strategies and expertise in engineering design. Thinking & Reasoning, 3(4),
247e270.
Ball, L., & Ormerod, T. (1995). Structured and opportunistic processing in design:
A critical discussion. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies(43),
131e151.
Bucciarelli, L. L. (2002). Between thought and object in engineering design.
Design Studies, 23(3), 219e231.
Chi, M. T. H. (1997). Quantifying qualitative analyses of verbal Data : A practical
guide. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 6(3), 271e315.
Christensen, B. T. (2010). Images of users and products shown during design pro-
cesses increase users willingness to use the design outcome. Artificial Intelli-
gence for Engineering Design, Analysis and Manufacturing: AIEDAM, 24(2),
179e189.
Christensen, B. T., & Ball, L. J. (2014). Studying design cognition in the real world
using the “in vivo” methodology. In P. Rodgers, & J. Yee (Eds.), The routledge
companion to design research (pp. 317e328). Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Christensen, B. T., & Schunn, C. D. (2009). The role and impact of mental simu-
lation in design. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23(3), 327e344.Design Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
Empirically analysing deCohen, J. (1968). Weighted Kappa: Nominal scale agreement with provision for
scaled disagreement or partial credit. Psychological Bulletin, 70(4), 213e220.
Cross, N. (2001). Design cognition: Results from protocol and other empirical
studies of design activity. In C. Eastman, W. Newstetter, & M. McCracken
(Eds.), Design knowing and learning: Cognition in design education (pp.
79e103). Oxford: Elsevier.
de Bono, E. (1992). Serious creativity: Using the power of lateral thinking to create
new ideas. Michigan: HarperBusiness.
DeChurch, L. a, & Mesmer-Magnus, J. R. (2010). The cognitive underpinnings of
eﬀective teamwork: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95(1),
32e53.
Dong, A. (2007). The enactment of design through language. Design Studies,
28(1), 5e21.
Dong, A., Garbuio, M., & Lovallo, D. (2016). Generative sensing in design eval-
uation. Design Studies, 45, 68e91.
Dong, A., Kleinsmann, M. S., & Deken, F. (2013). Investigating design cognition
in the construction and enactment of team mental models. Design Studies,
34(1), 1e33.
Dong, A., Lovallo, D., & Mounarath, R. (2015). The eﬀect of abductive reasoning
on concept selection decisions. Design Studies, 37, 37e58.
Dorst, K. (2011). The core of ‘design thinking’ and its application. Design Studies,
32(6), 521e532.
Dorst, K., & Cross, N. (2001). Creativity in the design process: Co-evolution of
problemesolution. Design Studies, 22, 425e437.
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Protocol analysis (revised ed). Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fann, K. T. (1970). Peirce’s theory of abduction. The Hague: Martinushoﬀ.
Fleiss, J. L. (1981). Statistical methods for rates and proportions (2nd ed.). New
York: John Wiley.
Galle, P. (1996a). Design rationalization and the logic of design: A case study.
Design Studies, 17(3), 253e275.
Galle, P. (1996b). Replication protocol analysis: A method for the study of real-
world design thinking. Design Studies, 17, 181e200.
Galle, P. (2002). Exploring implicit design knowledge by logical analysis of argu-
ments. In P. Galle, & G. E. Laster (Eds.), Knowledge for creative decision-
making: Proceedings of a special focus symposium under InterSymp-2002 in
baden-baden, Germany (pp. 27e31). Windsor: International Institute for
Advanced Studies in Systems Research and Cybernetics.
Goldschmidt, G. (2009). The dialects of sketching. Creativity Research Journal,
4(2), 123e143.
Goldschmidt, G. (2014). Linkography: Unfolding the design process. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Hatchuel, A., & Weil, B. (2008). C-K design theory: An advanced formulation.
Research in Engineering Design, 19(4), 181e192.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2009). How we reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Klimoski, R., & Mohammed, S. (1994). Team mental model: Construct or meta-
phor? Journal of Management, 20(2), 403e437.
Koskela, L., Paavola, S., & Kroll, E. (2018). The role of abduction in production
of new ideas in design. In P. E. Vermaas, & S. Vial (Eds.), Advancements in the
philosophy of design (pp. 153e183). Springer.sign reasoning patterns 69
70Kroll, E., & Koskela, L. (2015). On abduction in design. In J. S. Gero (Ed.),
Design computing and cognition ’14 (pp. 327e344). London: Springer.
Kudrowitz, B. M., & Wallace, D. (2012). Assessing the quality of ideas from pro-
liﬁc, early-stage product ideation. Journal of Engineering Design, 24(2), 1e20.
Landis, R. J., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for
categorical data. Biometrics, 33(1), 159e174.
Lloyd, P., & Scott, P. (1994). Discovering the design problem. Design Studies, 16,
125e140.
Magnani, L. (1995). Creative processes in scientiﬁc discovery. European Journal
for High Ability, 6(2), 160e169.
Magnani, L. (2004). Reasoning through doing. Epistemic mediators in scientiﬁc
discovery. Journal of Applied Logic, 2(4), 439e450.
March, L. (1976). The logic of design. In L. March (Ed.), The architecture of form
(pp. 16e40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McDonnell, J. (2012). Accommodating disagreement: A study of eﬀective design
collaboration. Design Studies, 33(1), 44e63.
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an
argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 57e74, discussion
74-111.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Idea deﬁnition. Retrieved December 3, 2015, from
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idea
Osborn, A. F. (1953). Applied imagination. Oxford, England: Scribner.
Oxford. (n.d.). Idea deﬁnition. Retrieved December 3, 2015, from http://www.ox-
forddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/english/idea
Peirce, C. S. (1980). The collected papers of charles sanders Peirce. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press.
Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1973). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argu-
mentation. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press.
Polk, T. a., & Newell, A. (1995). Deduction as verbal reasoning. Psychological Re-
view, 102(3), 533e566.
Reichertz, J. (2010). Abduction: The logic of discovery of grounded theory. Forum
for Qualitative Social Research, 11(1).
Rittel, H. W. J. (1987). The reasoning of designers. Delivered at the international
congress on planning and design theory. Boston.
Roozenburg, N. F. M. (1993). On the pattern of reasoning in innovative design.
Design Studies, 14(1), 4e18.
Roozenburg, N. F. M. (1995). What is Design? In N. F. M. Roozenburg (Ed.),
Product design: Fundamentals and methods (pp. 53e81) New York: John Wiley
and Sons.
Roozenburg, N. F. M., & Cross, N. G. (1991). Models of the design process: Inte-
grating across the disciplines. Design Studies, 12(4), 215e220.
Sch€on, D. A. (1991). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action.
London: Routledge.
Schurz, G. (2007). Patterns of abduction. Synthese, 164(2), 201e234.
Stumpf, S. C., & McDonnell, J. T. (2002). Talking about team framing: Using
argumentation to analyse and support experiential learning in early design ep-
isodes. Design Studies, 23(1), 5e23.
Valkenburg, R., & Dorst, K. (1998). The reﬂective practice of design teams.
Design Studies, 19(3), 249e271.
Visser, W. (1994). Organisation of design activities: Opportunistic, with hierarchi-
cal episodes. Interacting with Computers, 6(3), 239e274.
Voss, J. F. (2006). Toulmin’s model and the solving of ill-structured problems.
Argumentation, 19(3), 321e329.Design Studies Vol 60 No. C January 2019
